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The Toll Extracted
workers and safety in southern new mexico mining
Jamie L. Bronstein

O

n 30 June 1998, Reynaldo Delgado and the rest of the crew at the smelting plant in Hurley, New Mexico, were shorthanded and pushing to
make up production after a ten-day shutdown. At first everything was running
smoothly: the molten ore inside the smelter was separating into copper and
slag (impurities in the ore), and the slag was passing down into a large ladle
below to be discarded. Then, however, the mud gun that normally closed up
the full ladle failed, and the slag began to overflow. Delgado’s bosses ordered
him to remove the ladle manually, despite the molten slag now pouring over
the ladle’s brim. Delgado entered the smelter’s tunnel, and then hesitated.
Over his radio, he asked to be excused from what he knew to be a dangerous
task, but his supervisor insisted that he continue. Delgado stumbled back out
of the tunnel moments later covered in third-degree burns. As his coworkers
poured water over his body, he asked, “Why did they send me in there? I told
them I couldn’t do it. They made me do it anyway.” He died in agony three
weeks later at a Tucson burn center, leaving a widow and two little girls.1
Jamie L. Bronstein is a professor of history at New Mexico State University. Her interests include
British history, labor history, and the history of New Mexico. She is the author of four books,
including, most recently, Empire, State, and Society: Modern Britain, 1830–Present (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). The author would like to thank the Office of the State Historian of
New Mexico for support associated with the History Scholars Program. The staffs at the New
Mexico State Records Center and Archives, the Center for Southwest Research, and the Rio
Grande Historical Collections have been generous with their time and expertise. Thanks also
to Michael Zigmond, P.E., for helpful feedback on technical questions and Roger D. Huffman
for the tour of the Cobre mine.
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Delgado’s death was grisly, but it was hardly unprecedented. Mining and
milling have always been dangerous occupations, and even today, stories like
this or of miners trapped or killed underground attract international interest.2
New Mexico’s economy has traditionally relied on the state’s natural
resources: empty spaces that can be used for military testing, vast tracts
suitable for ranchland, breathtaking landscapes that attract tourists, and the
extractive industries. Oil and natural gas, coal and copper, and uranium
and potash have all brought tangible benefits, sometimes at the expense of
individual workers’ health and safety. Over the course of the last century, in
return for regular wages and benefits, New Mexico miners have assumed
substantial risks. Until production in New Mexico’s coal mines declined in
the mid-twentieth century, explosions in mines wiped out hundreds of lives.3
The story of Navajo uranium miners of northwestern New Mexico who were
exposed to life-shortening radiation and found their communities despoiled
by the mining process is still unfolding.4 Even in mines that are supposed to
be safer or cleaner—lead, copper, zinc, and potash, classified as the “metal
and nonmetal mines”—workers have faced dangers in the workplace and
obstacles to effective government response.
Despite living in a western state where unions have been traditionally
controversial, metal and nonmetal miners collectively were in favor of agitating for safety regulations after World War II. Organized through a national
union in the 1930s and 1940s, their actions over the course of the next sixty
years helped shift the power dynamic when it came to dealing with workplace
accidents. In the 1940s, the New Mexico mine inspectorate was committed to
promoting economic development, which meant that accidents were seen as
unavoidable or caused by worker negligence. By the 1960s, after several highprofile accidents, the inspectorate became more sensitive to worker concerns,
although it was still closely allied with the mining companies.5 Given the
chronic underfunding of New Mexico’s mine inspectorate, miners thought
federal safety rules and oversight of mine safety were crucial. Throughout
the 1960s, New Mexico workers at the grassroots level used their power to
achieve these goals.
While the workers at both the copper mines of Grant County and the
potash mines of Carlsbad unionized around the same time, those in the
copper mines had more long-term success changing safety regulations and
policy. Over time, deaths in the copper mines decreased while those in the
potash mines increased. Worker self-advocacy seemed tied to the nature of
particular mined commodities and the culture of specific firms. A number
of factors contributed to this discrepancy. Carlsbad potash mineworkers typically lived in the city of Carlsbad, allowing for a greater number of social ties
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and concerns outside the mines. Grant County miners, on the other hand,
tended to live on land owned by the copper companies, which created more
solidarity of purpose among the workers there. Pushed together by cultural
unity and adversity, Mexican American workers of Grant County’s copper
mines advocated for themselves more skillfully than did workers in the Anglodominated Carlsbad potash mines. Until the potash companies in the Carlsbad basin were acquired by Canadian companies, foreign competition made
them operate on a knife-edge of profitability, limiting the extent to which
Carlsbad miners could effectively achieve workplace reforms. Finally, the
Grant County copper industry developed at the turn of the twentieth century,
when labor paternalism was popular, while the potash industry of Carlsbad
was founded in the 1930s, when paternalism was no longer the fashion. The
different dates of origination could explain the contrasting levels of success
in changing the attitudes toward worker safety. In the 1950s, Kennecott Copper, one of the largest companies in the Grant County area and inheritor of
copper companies that had utilized a paternalistic approach, for example,
initiated an innovative worker-safety program that helped lower both mine
fatalities and accidents that kept employees from missing work.6
Copper Paternalism and Boomtown Potash
The copper and zinc mines of Grant County and the potash mines of
Carlsbad developed in different eras and through different processes. Since
the first decade of the twentieth century, workers commercially cultivated
the copper mines initiated by Native Americans centuries before, and paternalistic employers dominated these isolated mining camps. At Tyrone in
Grant County and at Dawson in northeastern New Mexico, for example,
the Phelps Dodge Corporation built schools, hospitals, community centers,
and mercantile stores for its workforce. In response to events like the Bisbee
deportation in 1917 and the Red Scare of 1919–21, Phelps Dodge promoted
Americanization and citizenship classes. The company encouraged workers
to pursue “clean recreation” through sports teams and clubs, and it provided
swimming pools, gyms, theaters, and golf courses.7 Paternalism, however,
came at some cost to workers: Phelps Dodge imposed a dual-wage system that
discriminated against Mexican immigrants.8 The company also curtailed free
speech, inhibited unionization, and, by extension, restricted the freedom to
advocate for safer workplaces. Although the coal mine explosion in Dawson,
New Mexico, in 1913—one of the worst in U.S. history with a total of 263 lives
claimed—would have been avoided if there had been sufficient ventilation,
Phelps Dodge blamed the incident on an illegal dynamite charge fired by a
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miner underground.9 This response is indicative of the overarching attitude
in mining industries on both the state and national levels at the time.
While paternalism and the promotion of company values receded in the
1930s and 1940s, they did not disappear completely. The companies that
eventually were acquired by Kennecott Copper retained, through several
name changes, company housing, a company store in Santa Rita, and the
provision of leisure activities. Segregation of the workforce also continued.
White workers in Hurley and Santa Rita were offered use of the Chino club,
with “a snack bar and recreation room, a card room, a reading room with current popular magazines and a rather extensive library, bowling alleys, tennis
courts, outdoor basketball court, handball court and space for roller skating.”
In contrast, Mexican American workers had only the “Casino,” with a snack
bar, a room with a television set and three pool tables, and restrooms.10
The institutionalized division of space for workers’ leisure activities reflected other, equally unpalatable modes of discrimination. Grant County
mining companies segregated their workforces through control of entry into
certain job categories. Higher-paying jobs considered “skilled”—driving
vehicles, operating machinery, working in the shops, and managing others—
were off limits to workers of Mexican ancestry. Housing segregation was also
widespread. Kennecott Copper and its antecedent companies maintained two
types of company housing. Sturdy, multiroom “American” housing rented
for between eight dollars and twenty-two dollars a month. For “SpanishAmerican” housing, however, workers paid a nominal fee for ground rent plus
a monthly fee for electricity. These tenants also were required to construct
their own cabins out of scavenged materials. Single, male, Spanish-speaking
workers might also live in a “Mexican bunkhouse,” a group dormitory.11
Participants in the Empire Zinc strike in Bayard, New Mexico (1950–52),
documented in the movie Salt of the Earth (1954), remembered separate
and unequal facilities as one of the factors that motivated their discontent.12
Like copper, potash played a key role in the mid-twentieth-century New
Mexico economy. New Mexico’s potash deposits were accidentally discovered
by oil drillers in the late 1920s, and the U.S. Potash Company started its first
potash mine near Carlsbad in 1929 on leased federal land.13 The Potash Company of America entered the field in 1933, and the International Minerals and
Chemical Corporation in 1936.
These potash companies did not subscribe to the labor paternalism that
defined the mining companies of Grant County, providing their workforces
with few benefits. Carlsbad mines—like some mining companies in Grant
County—used a dual-wage, low-paid labor system but, in their case, tried to keep
Mexican American workers off their payrolls altogether. U.S. Potash initially

fall 2012

bronstein N 427

paid some workers only fifteen to twenty cents per hour.14 “We wanted to be
over the minimum and yet on the other hand we had to respect the local feeling that we must not disturb the economy too much in those days,” explained
Horace Albright, who resigned as the second director of the National Park
Service to become the general manager of U.S. Potash in 1933. Similarly,
Potash Company of America, short on cash, later successfully appealed to
the federal government to be allowed to pay less than the federally mandated
wage of twenty-five cents an hour. Albright called this a “racial wage,” noting,
“I don’t know of any white people that got as low as 15, 20 cents an hour.”15
The requirement that all workers in higher-paid positions in the company
shops speak English abetted segregation.
According to Albright, the goal of the potash firms in Carlsbad was to
hire as few Mexican American workers as possible “because the saying was,
‘You hire a Mexican, and after he earns $5 he’ll lay off, he’ll buy a new pair
of overalls if he needs them, he’ll buy some beans, and some chili, and then
he’ll gamble the rest of it.’ . . . They weren’t reliable, and they aren’t today, in
many cases, in many parts of the state.” Albright, like many other employers
of the time, was openly discriminatory: “When I first went down there, it was
evident that these people of Mexican origin not only lived very simply and
very poorly, I thought, but there seemed to be a feeling on the part of the local people that you couldn’t do anything with them.” Labor shortages during
World War II forced Carlsbad potash firms to hire more Mexican American
workers, but Carlsbad miners were still largely Anglo workers from southern
states.16
The potash industry faced unique economic challenges. While copper
had high value-added military and industrial uses, potash is a key ingredient
in a rather humble commodity: fertilizer. In an age of copper wiring and
a burgeoning defense industry, copper was a fairly steady seller, although
its price fluctuated over time. Potash mining companies, however, could
increase demand only by convincing fertilizer firms to use more potash.17
In an effort to market their product more broadly, potash companies began
publishing the magazine Better Crops with Plant Food in 1923, and in 1935,
they founded the American Potash Institute to fund soil science research. In
World War II, the government diverted the purer potash for use in chemicals
valuable to the wartime defense industry. This move forced potash companies to pull back on their established business with fertilizer manufacturers
and endangered their bottom line. Potash companies faced other financial
setbacks as well. In one instance, Pecos Valley farmers sued potash producers,
claiming that the salt byproduct of potash production was being dumped in
the Pecos River and ruining their crops.18
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Despite these obstacles, by the late 1940s, the original three companies in
the potash basin had been joined by the Duval Potash and Sulphur Company; Southwest Potash, which was a subsidiary of American Metals Climax
Company; and National Potash, which was a subsidiary of Freeport Sulphur.
Over a twenty-year period, the potash industry transformed Carlsbad from a
sleepy town of between twenty-five hundred and three thousand people to
a small city of twenty-five thousand. Carlsbad Caverns had brought in some
tourist traffic, but now, Carlsbad was “built on potash, operated on potash.”19
By the 1950s, Carlsbad potash was king, though a coup was on the horizon.
Canada, which possesses about 75 percent of the world’s potash reserves,
brought ten potash mines into production between 1962 and 1971. At first the
Canadians were able to serve only as “residual suppliers” because the United
States had contracts with many fertilizer producers, but this did not remain
the case for long. The entry of such a vast supply into the market depressed
prices, and Canada was accused of dumping potash at below-market prices.20
Carlsbad residents ranging from middle-school students to mine workers to
professionals flooded their local congressman’s office with petitions for protective legislation to block the importation of cheap Canadian potash.21 The
low profit margins in potash and the tenuousness of the industry were clear
to Carlsbad workers, who had to balance demands for workplace changes
against the health of the industry.
Unionization
Although the mining workforces of Grant County and Carlsbad differed in
ethnic composition, economic challenges, and the degree of paternalism
practiced by their companies, they both organized under the same union:
the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers (Mine-Mill).
Mine-Mill was the second incarnation of the radical Western Federation of
Miners, which had gained notoriety in the very early years of the twentieth
century for its militancy and intense conflicts with mining companies. Although Mine-Mill’s presence in Grant County dated back to the 1930s, when
it organized the American Smelting and Refining Company’s (ASARCO’s)
mine and mill into Local 890, the union made serious inroads into organizing Mexican American workers during World War II.22 Mine-Mill in Grant
County became known as the “Mexican Union” because 90 percent of Local
890’s membership was Mexican American, and meetings were held in both
Spanish and English.23 As historian Christopher Huggard notes, the members
were energized by labor and social activist Clinton Jencks, who, with his wife
Virginia, inspired Mexican American workers to see their struggles against
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local copper mines as part of a larger proletarian struggle.24 By the end of the
1940s, Mine-Mill’s Local 890 had become a greenhouse for the cultivation of
leadership. Mexican American candidates ran for local offices; mineworkers
formed a chapter of the Asociación Nacional Mexicana Americana (ANMA),
a civil-rights lobbying group; and Mexican Americans began to be elected
to Mine-Mill’s executive board.25 A burgeoning national Mexican American
civil rights movement provided additional solidarity.
Mine-Mill moved into Carlsbad after World War II, forming Local 415, and
the Potash Company of America signed a collective bargaining agreement
under their auspices in June 1946. The agreement raised the prevailing wage
by almost twenty cents an hour; offered wage premiums for the second and
graveyard shifts; provided a life insurance policy and medical, hospital, and
retirement benefits; and rewarded workers with a week’s paid vacation after
one year on the job. The agreement also created a safety committee, which
worked with the mine’s safety inspector, inspected the mine and surface plant
monthly, and made suggestions for improvements. This deal was similar to
those that Mine-Mill and other unions struck with other companies in Carlsbad. Unionization at International Minerals and Chemical Corporation, for
example, brought workers increased base rates, bonuses, and a safety program
that, while neither “flashy” nor “spectacular,” was “continuously stressed by
the supervisory staff. Safety is kept in front of each employee as often as is
practicable and possible.”26 Three-man committees from each department
conducted regular safety inspections. Finally, unionization brought Carlsbad
miners changing rooms, lunchrooms, and a public pool.

ill. 1. carlsbad’s u.s. borax potash refinery dominates the landscape
(Photograph courtesy New Mexico State University Library, Archives and
Special Collections, neg. no. 03860015)
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Mine-Mill forced Carlsbad mine operators to recognize that the employeremployee relationship was not naturally harmonious. In 1948 and 1949/50, the
miners went on strike at the Carlsbad potash mines over various grievances,
including absenteeism policies. When the companies responded with an injunction under the Taft-Hartley Act, opening the picket line to strikebreakers
and enjoining the miners from picketing, workers’ wives and children took
over the picket line, just as they would in the Empire Zinc strike in 1951.27
By the mid-1950s, Local 415 had more than a thousand Carlsbad members.
They participated enthusiastically in that union’s culture, holding a March
of Dimes baby-picture contest and square dances to keep the membership
together, building a luxurious union hall with an auditorium that seated three
hundred people, and publishing their own newspaper, Potash Dust.
But Mine-Mill’s dominance in Carlsbad was short-lived for several reasons.
As historian Jack Cargill points out, despite their efforts at solidarity, striking Carlsbad workers lacked the community resources possessed by Grant
County miners. In Grant County, miners gravitated toward Mine-Mill as a
minority-serving union that could address their civil rights concerns. Workers in Carlsbad, however, divided into small bargaining units, which were
constantly “raided” by other unions seeking to represent them, including
the stoneworkers, an independent potash workers’ union, and the United
Mineworkers.28 Another obstacle to the success of Mine-Mill in Carlsbad was
that the union was known for its aggressively class-conscious rhetoric and for
the communist leanings of some of its leaders. (Local 890’s representative
to the international union, Clinton Jencks, found himself subject to federal
prosecution in a high-profile case concerning his communist past.) Many
Grant County miners appreciated the communists’ reformism, but Carlsbad
workers who chose Mine-Mill lived under the pressure of constant red-baiting
by the editors of Carlsbad’s local newspaper, the Argus.29 During the second
week of March 1953, both the Bayard Local 890 and the Carlsbad Local 415
suffered mysterious fires in their union halls. While passing union members
noticed the Bayard fire and saved the hall, the Carlsbad hall burned to the
ground.30
The negatives of union membership outweighed the positives for many
potash workers in Carlsbad, who drifted away from Mine-Mill and gravitated
first to one union and then to another. Local 415 disbanded in the 1950s. In
contrast, by the time Grant County’s Mine-Mill Local 890 was absorbed
into the United Steelworkers Association in 1967, it had a long enough and
strong enough history to be allowed to remain a self-contained organization
within the Steelworkers.31 As copper workers and potash workers faced the
challenges of the dangerous workplace, copper workers had the upper hand.

fall 2012

bronstein N 431

Death Comes for the Miner
Miners faced a number of potentially deadly dangers on a daily basis, although
injury accidents far outnumbered fatal accidents. Between 1948 and 1951,
for example, Carlsbad’s potash companies experienced a total of five fatal
accidents all together. From the beginning of 1950 through April 1951, U.S.
Potash alone reported fifty-six lost-time accidents, ranging from strained tendons to lacerations and broken digits.32 If U.S. Potash was at all typical, there
were more than ten lost-time accidents in Carlsbad for every potash fatality.
But the possibility for a fatality lurked around every corner. In underground
metal mines, roof falls were a central occupational hazard. Before entering
a particular stall to begin mining, miners were supposed to tap the roof to
see whether it produced a hollow sound that indicated it might be loose.
This was not an exact science, however, and a ceiling that failed to make
a “drummy” sound might still fall and kill a miner.33 In 1950 Florencio Eli
Esquibel at Kearney Mine, in Hanover, New Mexico, went to “bar down” a
piece of rock that was hanging in place from the previous night’s shift and it
fell on him. The piece of rock broke his back, broke his leg in several places,
and produced fatal shock and hemorrhage. In 1973 a twenty-nine-year-old
worker at ASARCO’s Groundhog Mine in Vanadium, New Mexico, was
killed instantly while “scaling down” or using a tool to remove loose walls
in a drift. Another miner was found with his face buried in muck up to his
ears; his body had to be extracted with a hydraulic jack.34
Roof falls were not hazardous solely in metal mines. In 1958 James “Shorty”
Powell, a potash miner working under a slab that had been partially barred
down and judged safe to work under, was killed when a ten-foot-square piece
of roof landed on him. The most serious kind of roof fall was caused by a
“blowout,” in which boring equipment hit an air pocket, causing an explosion. Ten potash miners were injured in the National Potash Company’s
mine when an air pocket caused the collapse of a three-hundred-foot-long
section of roof in 1974.35
Other accidents occurred when mining machinery met the human body.
In 1953 Bill Richardson, a fifty-two-year-old potash churn driller, fatally
fractured his skull when a pulley sheave, lacking a safety cable, separated
from his drill.36 Billy Kemp, a twenty-nine-year-old potash miner, became
entrapped in the moving parts of a conveyor belt. Although no one witnessed
the accident, the mine inspector concluded that Kemp must have been attempting to fix the conveyor belt when it was in motion.37 Miners could also
be killed after losing their footing or when being raised from or lowered to
the working level.38 In 1948 Elauterio Gonzales was fatally injured when the
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skip he was riding caught on a piece of steel and he plunged two hundred
and twenty-five feet to the bottom.39 In 1967 three miners were hospitalized
after one of the three slipped from a platform at the 1300 level (that is, thirteen
hundred feet below the earth’s surface), fell forty feet, and crashed into the
other two miners.40 David White, the face boss at Carlsbad’s International
Minerals and Chemical Corporation mine, was killed in March 1950 while
riding up in an elevator with twelve other employees. The elevator operator
misinterpreted the bell signals that were sent to him to raise and lower the
elevators, causing two elevators to come to the collar at the same time. White
was crushed between the collar and the cage. In 1957 Clinton Conaway was
killed in the elevator of the U.S. Potash Company shaft when a falling object
hit him on the head.41
Blasting led to some of the more horrific multivictim accidents. In 1947
four workers ranging in age from twenty-two to thirty were killed at the
copper mine in Fierro, New Mexico, when the dynamite charge that they
were preparing detonated before they had time to clear the area. A Hanover
copper miner was killed and two more injured because of confusion about
whether all miners had been cleared from an area prior to blasting (two of
the miners shared the nickname “Red”). Three workers at Phelps Dodge’s
Tyrone mine were killed in 1949 when trying to prepare thirty-eight blasting holes simultaneously.42 Even in an open-pit mine, the dynamite used in
blasting could ignite and pose a danger. In 1954 a truck exploded at Kennecott
Copper’s Santa Rita mine, killing
four workers. The state and federal
governments conducted side-by-side
investigations, but the cause of the
blast remained unknown.43
Vehicles moving underground
across unstable terrain also threatened miners. Forty-two-year-old
Ervin Wells, a bulldozer driver at
Phelps Dodge’s Tyrone mine, was
killed when his bulldozer toppled
off a muck pile, down a shaft, and
onto another level of the mine,
traveling end over end until the
ill. 2. the aftermath of a blasting
cab smashed. The mine inspector
truck explosion at santa rita in 1954
concluded that maneuvers like the
(Photograph courtesy New Mexico State
one Wells was attempting should be
University Library, Archives and Special
permitted only in daylight, under
Collections, neg. no. 03200276)
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direct supervision, and with equipment mounted on crawlers rather than
wheels. Wells was still assigned the blame for “failure to properly evaluate
the hazards of the job” and “deviation from the established method of doing
the job.”44 Willard Rhinehart, a Southwest Potash Company employee, fell
to his death from a moving train of empty mine cars in 1962. William Smart
backed a shuttle car into an overhang and was crushed in 1967, leading to
a reconsideration of the requirement to move cars in reverse underground.
In 1987 Roy McDaniel, a worker for the Lundberg Industries potash mine,
was crushed to death by a continuous mining machine.45 Achilles Perini, a
miner with thirty-one years of experience, was run over by a truck that had
slipped on the block placed under its wheel.46

ill. 3. mechanization at a carlsbad potash mine in 1960
(Photograph courtesy New Mexico State University Library, Archives
and Special Collections, neg. no. 03860010)

Exposed electrical wiring was particularly menacing to potash miners. In
1940 William “Slim” Williams was electrocuted by 2200 volts while working
alone on a power line at the Union Potash and Chemical Company. Tony
Garcia, a worker at Potash Company of America, was burned over half his
body when his scooter contacted a 440-volt cable underground in 1973.
Sam W. Jordan Jr., an electrician at International Minerals and Chemical
Corporation, died while trying to repair a fan.47
Although the cost of workplace fatalities to companies rose over the twentieth century, the proportion of loss borne by a worker and his family remained
disproportionate to that absorbed by the mining companies.48 Native New
Mexican Richard L. Sierra grew up in a household headed by his widowed
mother, a laundress. The fifth of eleven surviving children, Sierra worked
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in the copper mines at an early age to support his own family.49 On 22 May
1962, Sierra, repairing a shaft for the Peru mining company, stood on a ladder with a rotten rung. He fell and severed his spinal cord. Sierra’s accident
occurred during a period of particular scrutiny of mine accidents; federal
regulation of copper mines was under discussion, and accident statistics were
being systematically collected. The U.S. Bureau of Mines recommended that
New Mexico mines replace their defective ladders and landings and require
men working in the shafts to wear safety belts.
Mine-Mill, Sierra’s union, policed compliance with these new regulations, but it was too late for Sierra.50 At age forty-six, he went from being his
large family’s breadwinner to being dependent on his wife and son and was
confined to a veterans’ nursing home at Fort Bayard. With great patience,
he exercised his hands enough to pull himself up to a seated position using
a crossbar above his hospital bed. He wrote poetry about brave World War
II veterans and coached little-league baseball on weekends from a portable
wheelchair.51 Six years after the accident, at the age of fifty-three, Sierra died
of a heart attack at home, leaving behind three sons, five daughters, and ten
grandchildren.52 Southern New Mexico newspapers reported little beyond
the bare fact that a fatality or a disabling accident had occurred in a mine.53
In all, the New Mexico state mine inspector recorded one hundred and
ten fatal accidents for southern New Mexico mines between 1933 and 1974.
In the Grant County area mines, forty fatalities occurred over these four
decades, with twenty-six occurring between 1949 and 1954. In fact, after
1956, one fatality or no fatalities in a given year became the norm there. In
contrast, the Carlsbad mines reported no fatalities until 1948. From then on,
the number of fatalities remained steadily higher than in the Grant County
mines: eight fatalities between 1959 and 1961, six in 1964–65, six in 1966–67,
and six in 1972–74. Between 1948 and 1974, the Carlsbad potash mines recorded a total of fifty-four fatalities.54
There were a number of factors that contributed to the increase in Carlsbad mine fatalities while those in Grant County decreased. One factor was
that one of the largest mines in Grant County was an open-pit mine, where
fatal accidents were less likely. Further, more militant unionism in Grant
County led to several protracted strikes. Since the number of mine accidents
is directly related to the amount of productivity, when the mines were shut
down or nearly so during a strike, the opportunity for accidents decreased.
Moreover, roof bolting was used more frequently in metal mines than in
potash mines, Carlsbad mines were still using moving vehicles underground
rather than safer conveyor belts, and the potash mines appear to have had a
much greater problem with exposed high-voltage wires.55
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There was also a difference in safety
culture between the two areas. Kennecott Copper, one of the largest employers in the Grant County region,
promoted itself as a leader in safety.56
Workers were required to wear hard
hats, safety goggles, and reinforced-toe
boots beginning in 1957. Miners who
used safety gear were publicly inducted into safety societies: the “wise
old owl” club for vision protection, ill. 4. reyes g. torrez with safety
the “golden shoe” club for feet protec- glasses
tion, and the “turtle club” for head (Photograph courtesy New Mexico State
protection (its motto: “Shell on head: University Library, Archives and Special
we’re not dead”).57 Kennecott had its Collections, neg. no. 03200302)
own safety mascot, “Sammy Safety,” a
cartoon character with a hard hat and a circle body emblazoned with “Green
Cross for Safety” across the front. Employees at Kennecott’s Hurley smelter
and Chino mine had annual safety competitions; all employees at whichever
plant had the fewest injuries
would receive free turkeys,
free hams, or green stamps
usable at the store.58 A later
campaign involved “safety
stocks,” in which each department had its own imaginary stock price that would
rise and fall with the number
of injuries.59 The attempt to
build a positive safety culture was sometimes accompanied by browbeating. In

ill. 5. sammy safety’s
new contest can mean
ham for everybody!
(Photograph courtesy New
Mexico State University
Library, Archives and
Special Collections)
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ill. 6. santa rita mine wins safety contest 1960
(Photograph courtesy New Mexico State University Library, Archives
and Special Collections, neg. no. 03200457)

1959, when there were nine lost-time accidents and a fatality, the editor of the
company’s in-house newsletter, Chinorama, chided, “The carelessness, the
thoughtlessness, and the slightly unsafe work habits that caused these accidents
cannot be undone. Split seconds caught up with nine Chino employees.”60
Kennecott’s work in this area resulted in objective gains. In 1957, for
example, the company reported only 5.89 lost-time accidents per million
man-hours, compared with 11.20 for surface mining nationally. By 1970 the
company had improved to 3 lost-time accidents per million man-hours,
compared with 6.47 in the industry generally and 15.88 in non-coal mining.
The company won national awards for its low lost-time accident record on
multiple occasions.61 None of the Carlsbad-area potash mining concerns had
such a thoroughgoing safety program.
Responsibility for Workplace Accidents
Every fatal mine accident in New Mexico triggered a bureaucratic process.
In the 1930s and 1940s, coroner’s juries investigated mine accidents: a panel
of local men would convene to question the dead man’s workmates and
employers. Coroner’s inquests routinely endorsed prevailing opinions about
the causes of mine accidents—that they were truly accidental or, even worse,
caused by worker negligence. The cross-examination of one mine supervisor
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after a fatal accident is illustrative:
Q. There was no doubt that it was just an accident?
A. No.
Q. Unavoidable at that?
A. Yes.
Q. One of those unpleasant situations in life?
A. Yes.62
Coroner’s juries had a tendency to classify all mine-related deaths as accidental.
By the end of the 1940s, the New Mexico mining inspectorate routinely
investigated mine-related deaths and made recommendations. At first, similar
to the coroner’s juries, mine inspectors blamed workers for most accidents.
At the Burro Chief fluorspar mine in Tyrone, New Mexico, where men had
to wait for timber to be delivered to prop up ceilings, a roof fall killed miner
LeRoy Jones, an accident that might have been avoided if the ceiling had
been properly supported. In this case, mine inspector John A. Garcia (New
Mexico mining inspector from 1947 to 1959) ruled that “the prevention of
accidents requires cooperation between officials and employees, and such
cooperation can be attained only when the employees obey and carry out
orders given by the supervisors and company officials . . . your mine foreman
has full authority to fire any employee that does not carry out his orders. Furthermore, any contract work on a large scale shall be discontinued.” Jones’s
accident was recast into a question of the contract workers’ failure to obey
orders; although there was no evidence that any relevant orders had been
given.63 Garcia noted in another case that “testing of backs, and barring down
is the sole responsibility of individual workmen; therefore, in the interest of
mine safety I strongly recommended that individuals who insist on taking
chances and do not bar down be penalized.”64
The state mine inspector worked with deputies drawn from the industry
who were seemingly biased in their evaluation of evidence. A shaftsman at
ASARCO’s mine in Vanadium was found dead after a five-hundred-foot fall
down a shaft. Oddly, the body seemed to have touched neither the sides of the
shaft nor the bucket suspended in the shaft. D. Bruce Leake, a deputy mine
inspector who had operated several mines in Grant County from 1948 to 1950,
noted, “In view of the fact that we do not know what caused the deceased to
fall or how the body could have passed by the xhead and bucket in its fall,
I feel free to exonerate the company and all individuals concerned of any
responsibility for the accident which caused this man’s death.”65 A shaftsman
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at the Bullfrog mine in Bayard was cleaning muck when an eight-foot-long,
six-foot-wide, one-foot-thick piece of mine wall fell on his leg, requiring an
amputation at the scene. He died shortly after arriving at the hospital. Leake
assigned no responsibility for the accident, since propping up the roof of the
mine with more timber would have prevented blasting, the ground looked
safe, and there were no fractures. “It was one of those unforeseen hazards
that exist in mining and is so difficult to guard against,” Leake said in his
report.66 In a case of electrocution, Leake opined that electricians seemed to
believe that they could get a heavy shock but not die from the 220-volt current. “Over 90 percent of all accidents are caused by violations of the safety
rules,” he noted.67 And after nine blasting-related deaths in the Grant County
region in three years, Leake blamed the miners, who should have known
how to keep themselves safe. “In combating this condition of carelessness it
is suggested that a program of nagging be instituted. Nag the man that leaves
powder where it should not be. . . . nag the man that takes any chances with
explosives . . . and if he won’t take heed, FIRE HIM.”68
In the 1950s, the union and the public airing of information about safety
were beginning to have an impact, and the attitude of the state mine inspectors and deputy inspectors shifted considerably. Rather than holding miners
responsible, they started issuing specific suggestions for safety modifications
designed to keep workers out of dangerous situations entirely and blaming
supervisors for lapses.69 When a worker who was out of his working place
was killed by moving machinery in a crusher, Inspector Garcia suggested
that an unfenced area of the machinery be fenced.70 When a mucker was
knocked onto a track by a runaway train—an issue that the mine had never
had before—Garcia blamed lax supervisory practices.71 Garcia called a man’s
death in a conveyor-belt accident “inexcusable,” since it would have been
straightforward to screen the machinery. Because deputy mine inspectors
were scarce, Garcia urged workers to be the frontline of safety by refusing
to work in unsafe workplaces.72 Supervisors were not as keen on this new
approach, however, and miners taking this attitude could find themselves
fired and blacklisted. One miner who was buried in a potash-mine rock fall
for eleven hours was asked at the hospital about the state of the mine before
the accident. He said, “I told my wife some time ago that someday some of
us are going out there and not come back. That has been six or eight months
ago. We have been on lots of stuff that has been very treacherous looking. You
know what happened when three of our boys refused to go into a place not
too long ago and at my age I can’t get out and find work. I have my family
to support and I just try to do what they ask me to do.”73
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Worker Safety and Worker Action
Though subject to dangers on the job and only partially protected by state
mine inspection, mine and smelter workers in southern New Mexico did
not adopt a fatalistic attitude toward mine safety. Instead, beginning with
the advent of unionization in New Mexico’s mines in the late 1940s, workers followed a three-pronged strategy to pursue change: at the job-site level,
largely through safety committees; at the community level, through unionled job actions and grievances that could include state-level lobbying; and
at the federal level, by lobbying through Mine-Mill for effective regulatory
legislation to be extended from coal mining to metal and nonmetal mining.74
Workers participated in safety at the job-site level by demanding to be a
part of the rule-making process, a move that has resulted in lower accident
rates.75 Mine-Mill insisted that safety committees composed of workmen,
safety engineers, and foremen be a touchstone of each contract. Safety
committees inspected plants, pointed out infractions, investigated lost-time
and fatal accidents, and liaised with union representatives.76 Carlsbad Local
415 maintained a safety committee that pointed out violations and problems
directly to the potash companies.77 The union also printed up handbills for
distribution to the workforce that detailed companies’ safety violations and
the union’s crucial role in promoting safety compliance.78
Families witnessed workmates’ and employers’ post-accident depositions,
or hired lawyers to find out whether the companies had broken safety laws.
Occasionally family members were allowed to question witnesses during
safety hearings, and their presence clearly elicited sympathy from company
representatives. If family members did not participate in a given accident
investigation, a worker’s union brothers might.79 Excluded from an investigation into a worker’s death, Clinton Jencks, the Mine-Mill International’s
representative to Local 890, hired a Silver City lawyer to question witnesses
and defend the dead man’s reputation. In another case, Jencks announced
that he was “counsel for the deceased.”80 The union also arbitrated workers’
compensation cases: when Jesus Pedraza injured his back at Kennecott Copper and was compensated and then fired, the union sought arbitration and
the arbitrator ordered the company to reinstate him.81
The first week of June 1961 was dire for southern New Mexico’s miners,
with two fatalities in the potash mines and one at Kennecott Copper’s Hurley
smelter. At the investigation into the Kennecott Copper death, Local 890
president Juan Chacon loudly confronted state mine inspector William Hays
(inspector from 1959 to 1973). Kennecott Copper alleged that the miner had
committed suicide by crawling into machinery; Chacon sought to introduce
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evidence that the company had ignored workers’ complaints about unsafe
machinery. Hays was willing to hear him out: “There can’t nobody come in
and take over the hearing and call their witnesses and ask questions, but if
you have anything that you want cleared up or anything, we’ll clear it up,”
Hays said.82
Unions also advocated safety through direct action. Most famously,
members of Mine-Mill Local 890 physically portrayed the importance of
workplace safety by agreeing to appear in Salt of the Earth (1954), a film
based on the strike at Empire Zinc in 1950 to 1952 in Bayard, New Mexico.
In the film, an accident dramatically precipitates the miners’ walkout. After
the injured miner is taken away on a stretcher with his wife running after
him, his workmates confront the mine owner and the foreman. The film’s
male protagonist, Ramon, played by Local 890 president Juan Chacon, tells
the foreman that this was bound to happen when men were assigned to
work alone rather than in pairs, and that it was the foreman’s job to signal
when an explosion was impending. The foreman claims that he did signal
an impending explosion. The mine owner then notes that he does not like
accidents either, and that the company has more to lose from an accident
than the workers do.83 This short scene depicts many of the issues at stake in
mine accidents—including the assignment of blame after the fact.
Getting little recognition from the companies for their grievances about
mine safety, unions started communicating directly with the state mine inspector. Carlsbad’s Mine-Mill Local 415 president E. N. Gibbs continually
consulted with Inspector Garcia about possible safety violations, and Garcia
encouraged Gibbs to warn his men against working in unsafe areas.84 The
United Mine Workers and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers also consulted with Garcia about potash mine safety issues.85
In 1956 three Carlsbad workers constructing a shaft for the National Potash
Corporation were killed and two were injured in a mine elevator. The elevator’s safety device should have stopped the cage, but it had been removed to
clear an obstruction, and the cage fell to the bottom of the shaft—a distance
that witnesses estimated to be between 100 and 230 feet—with the helpless
men inside. After the cage plummeted to the bottom, the heavy cable fell on
top of it, compounding the men’s injuries. In his report about the accident,
Inspector Garcia concluded that the union and company management
had mutually agreed to remove the safety device, so that the men, as union
members, bore responsibility for their own deaths.86
The Carlsbad elevator incident precipitated a call for change.87 Prior to
the incident, Carlsbad workers had asked that a deputy mine inspector be
assigned to Carlsbad, to no avail. Instead, the deputy mine inspector assigned
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to Las Cruces (180 miles away) responded to all accidents in southern New
Mexico. Union leaders had banded together, organized by W. S. Roberts,
secretary of the New Mexico American Federation of Labor, hoping to find
strength in numbers. Inspector Garcia met representatives of Mine-Mill and
other unions, like Local 355 Operating Engineers, that represented parts of
the Carlsbad workforce. After the meeting, Garcia said the main obstacle
was financial: there just was not money in the department’s budget to pay
another deputy’s salary.88 After the incident in Carlsbad and in response to
an enraged public reaction, the State Board of Finance agreed to the unions’
demands and granted Garcia’s department $20,000 to hire two new deputy
mine inspectors: one for small mine operations and one for the Carlsbad area.
Two inspectors were chosen to temper any criticism that the potash industry
was being singled out for special treatment.89
Another uproar occurred in 1960, when thirteen miners died in uranium
mines in Grants, New Mexico, and two men in Carlsbad potash mines.90 The
sudden spike in fatalities prompted press investigations, which revealed that
even when inspectors cited mines as unsafe, mine operators often failed to
correct unsafe conditions without being sanctioned. Facing a reelection challenge and public pressure, Gov. John Burroughs put together a nine-member
mine safety committee consisting of an industrialist, two professors from the
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, three mine managers, and
three workers’ representatives.91 After a series of meetings, the safety committee
blamed the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for safety failures, since it had
pressured uranium companies into demanding the production of uranium
at an unsafe rate.92
In reaction to the report, labor leaders held their own mine safety conference in September 1960. They called for mine inspections three times
annually rather than once, for certification of all underground miners, and
for acts that disregarded mine safety to be classified as felonies. They also
decided that miners should learn first aid, and should never be required to
do solitary work out of earshot of others. Although Inspector Hays attended
the conference, he protested that his department would need a budget of
$100,000 ($15,000 more than he had been allocated) to comply with all these
demands.93
Direct action sometimes included strikes in support of workplace safety. In
1974 a sixty-four-year-old miner who had suffered a heart attack underground
at the former Empire Zinc mine died before he could get to a hospital. The
company-provided ambulance was not in good repair and its engine would
not start. Two days later, a similar incident occurred at the Kennecott mine:
the ambulance stalled on the way to the hospital and could not be restarted.
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Local 890 of the United Steelworkers—formerly of Mine-Mill Bayard—reacted
to the incidents with a walkout. The men refused to go back to work until the
company provided a new ambulance, which they did two weeks later.94
A similar case occurred in 1975 at ASARCO’s zinc mine in Vanadium
when an industrial accident caused Jose Villegas, a twenty-eight-year-old
motorman, to be fatally injured by the equipment he was operating. Found
by his coworkers, he had to be transported from the plant to the hospital in
a pickup truck because there was no way to get an ambulance out to the
mine. After an almost two-hour delay, Villegas arrived at the hospital and
was declared dead.95 ASARCO officials demanded that the men return to
work. Instead, eighty-six workers went on a wildcat strike (a strike without
union authorization) to demand an ambulance for their facility. While the
United Steelworkers did not support the strike, they refused to exert pressure
on the workforce to go back to work. In response to the miners’ demand for
an ambulance at the facility, officials noted that there was no ambulance
clause in the miners’ current contract, that the contract did not expire until
1976, and that an ambulance would cost $7,500.96
The Quest for Federal Regulation
New Mexico’s mine inspectorate exemplified a number of shortcomings
common to regulatory agencies in western states. First, the New Mexico
state constitution specified that mine inspector candidates must have years
of practical mining experience. Nonetheless, the position was politically
appointive, resulting in a triangulation among politicians who could bestow
favors, mining companies seeking to place former employees in influential
government positions, and unions eager to promote their own candidates (or
at least block hostile candidates). Second, mine owners and operators were
legally compelled to report only fatal accidents to the state mine inspector.
As a result, some very serious accidents went unreported, and it was difficult
for the mine inspector to gather information about the dangers of mining.97
Third, the inspector’s office was underfunded. Without a deputy inspector
in each mining region, the mine inspector and his existing deputies had to
drive across the state at a moment’s notice after every serious accident. To
make matters worse, they had to fight the state finance board for vehicles
capable of making the trip.
Mine inspectors also had to negotiate a peculiar line between attempting to
eradicate workplace accidents and alienating a wealthy and politically influential segment of the state’s constituency. The mine inspector often solved this
problem by holding extended hearings in the wake of every serious accident
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(a process that enabled the story of each accident to be told and emotions
aired in a very controlled setting), but then failed to assign accountability to
any party in particular. As Inspector Hays explained in every hearing over
which he presided, the purpose of the exercise was not to point fingers, but
rather to see whether any suggestions might be generated to prevent similar
accidents from happening in the future.
In 1962 a memo drafted by the leadership of Mine-Mill listed some of the
methods companies used to dodge the spirit of state laws, if not the letter.
To avoid reporting a lost-time accident, a company might “encourage” an
injured worker to take his vacation, so that none of the company’s work time
would officially be lost. Local 890 reported just such a case to the Mine-Mill
leadership during a safety study undertaken in 1962/63 to support the need
for federal regulation.98 A worker who would earn less than 50 percent of
his normal salary under worker’s compensation might be tempted with the
prospect of receiving his entire salary in return for reporting to work, even if
this meant just sitting around on the job or undertaking “light work” of some
kind. Companies might also pressure crews to work shorthanded while
the company paid the injured crewmember, a practice that exposed the
remaining workers to additional risk. When a man failed to file for workmen’s
compensation and a company failed to report an accident, the company’s
insurance premiums remained low, statistics of accidents were artificially
deflated, and the injured worker lost the right to collect payment for a reinjury or a flare-up of the same injury later. New Mexico’s mine workers knew
the potential benefits of federal regulation under these circumstances. As
metal miner Lorenzo Torrez noted: “A state inspector is usually an elected
position and thus subject to local political pressure. Not so with the federal
inspector.”99
New Mexico’s mine operators, as members of the New Mexico Mining
Association (NMMA), developed close relationships with the state’s mine
inspectors and consistently opposed federal regulation. To downplay the need
for federal oversight, they frequently boasted about the state’s achievements.
By the mid-1960s, seven state inspectors and deputy inspectors worked in New
Mexico while only one part-time federal Bureau of Mines representative canvassed the state. Between 1960 and 1965, the mining association established
central mine rescue stations in Grants, Silver City, and Carlsbad and formed
a safety committee consisting of all the safety engineers from its component
mines.100 Other arguments against federal regulation were more strained.
The mining association claimed that its safety campaigns had inculcated
a sense of personal responsibility for mine safety among mineworkers, and
that this sense of responsibility would be undermined if federal inspectors
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visited New Mexico mines.101 The fact that the NMMA moved so quickly
to institute industry-level reforms in the 1960s shows that even the threat of
federal regulation could effectively motivate change.
Mine-Mill had been lobbying for federal oversight of metal and nonmetal
mining since the mid-1950s, but a brief flurry of congressional investigation
of the issue in 1957 came to nothing. As the campaign restarted in the early
1960s, the union again presented evidence that metal and nonmetal mine
regulation was needed. In 1961, after intensive union lobbying, Congress
agreed to fund an official study of the extent of unsafe practices in metal
and nonmetal mines and the efficacy of voluntary accident reporting versus
mandatory reporting. Stewart Udall, secretary of the interior from 1961 to
1969, headed the committee that conducted the study. Mine-Mill Local 890
wanted to ensure that safety committees existed at each mine so that committee representatives could accompany Udall’s staff on fact-finding tours of the
plants chosen to be part of the government’s surveyed sample. Mine-Mill’s
research director at the time, Arthur Stuart, predicted that “Kennecott will
probably welcome this”; he thought that other operators might oppose it.102
Mine-Mill also asked its leaders to collect their own statistics on workplace
accidents over the course of the study period, and specifically instructed
workers to gather information about lost-time accidents at the Kennecott,
Empire, and Peru mines.103 Mine-Mill went on the offensive, noting that
companies were already trying to keep mine inspectors away from the scenes
of fatal accidents and that this was the “lowest kind of political interference
in the work of a bureau which should be kept above politics in the field of
safety.”104
Udall’s report, delivered to Congress in 1963, revealed a widespread
problem with state-level mine inspection. More than ten thousand lost-time
accidents occurred in metal and nonmetal mining during the study period,
including more than two hundred fatalities and more than three hundred
disabling injuries. Mine inspectors’ recommendations were often ignored,
and some mines failed to observe even routine safety procedures.105 To address these concerns, on 29 July 1963, U.S. senator Joseph Montoya of New
Mexico cosponsored federal mine safety legislation (the Metcalf-Montoya
Bill) that had been written by Mine-Mill. This federal mine inspection bill
would give federal regulators the right of entry to mines, require reporting
of accidents, and enable the promulgation of federal safety codes in noncoal
mining. The Johnson administration supported a different version of the
bill that focused only on mines and mills (excluding smelters) and on major
hazards. Other safety issues would have to be addressed in union contracts
with firms rather than on a national basis.106 In 1965 Colorado congressman
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Wayne Aspinall attempted to undermine the federal mine inspection bill by
introducing an amendment to exempt any states that had existing regimes of
state mine regulation, unless their governors specifically opted in to federal
oversight.107
Despite the opposition, the federal mine inspection bill went to committee in 1966, and Mine-Mill sent a lobbyist to monitor the discussion.
The entire union constituency put pressure on the intransigent members
of the committee (particularly Sen. Paul Fannin of Arizona).108 During the
negotiations, a mine explosion in Superior, Arizona, killed several workers.
These fatalities gave the union the opportunity to call attention to the need
for federal oversight in the mining industry by threatening to follow the
example of the coal industry and its “miners’ memorials.” After a coal mine
fatality, the mine workforce might walk off the job entirely, refusing to go
back to work until after the coworker’s funeral.109 The bill was passed as the
Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966. In the end, federal
inspectors were given primary responsibility, although state mining inspectorates were allowed to maintain many of their statutory responsibilities and
to “cooperate” with federal inspectors. Further, federal inspectors could
revoke permission for the state to have its own separate mine inspection
program unless minimum standards were met. The entire apparatus was
located in the Department of the Interior, but an appointive Federal Metal
and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Board of Review was created for decision
appeals—a move that, miners feared, would open the inspection process
to political influence.110
Despite the passage of the federal mine inspection bill, southern New
Mexico miners remained concerned that mine safety would be politicized.
Carlsbad miner J. D. Rogers expressed this concern in a letter he wrote to
Senator Montoya in the midst of Nixon’s appointments to the U.S. Bureau of
Mines: “The Super Market owner doesn’t employ a cotton picker to butcher,
the building contractor doesn’t employ a truck driver to lay brick, so why
should the Bureau employ anyone other than people with mining knowledge
in this capacity? . . . The Bureau wasn’t formed for the exclusive use of the
mine owner as the American Mining Congress seems to think.”111 Metal and
nonmetal mine safety got off to a rough start when the U.S. Bureau of Mines
assigned just one man, Frank Memmott, to draft the regulations for metal
and nonmetal mines. While Memmott was the son of a coal miner and had
a postgraduate certification in coal-mining safety, he came to the Bureau of
Mines directly from being a state legislator. He was assigned to the bureau’s
Seattle substation, despite Seattle’s distance from mines, and was deprived
of any administrative support. Not surprisingly he stepped down soon after
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being appointed to the post.112 The sloppy way in which the appointment was
handled led to protests by four senators from mining states, including New
Mexico’s Montoya. Although Memmott was not reinstated, safety regulations
and a federal inspectorate for health and safety in metal and nonmetal mines
were created soon after. Carlsbad’s Rogers immediately secured the job of
safety inspector for the Carlsbad area.113
In the late 1960s and after, the system of sole state inspection of southern
New Mexico’s mines gave way to a nominally cooperative regime.114 In reality,
however, the state inspector of mines was on the scene to report most accidents before any federal inspectors. The state and federal inspectors’ reports
seem to indicate that federal inspectors used the state reports as a reference
in their own findings. Although federal mine regulation was now a fait accompli, the state inspectorate continued to try to defend its particular brand
of autonomy. When Inspector Hays wrote to Congress to extol the virtues of
the New Mexico mine inspectorate, he used talking points supplied to him
by the New Mexico Mining Association.115
Despite continuities with the previous safety regime, federalization enabled
some improvements in mine safety. While the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic
Mine Safety Act had a very limited enforcement mechanism, noncoal and coal
mining achieved an equal regulatory footing in 1977 with the passage of the
Federal Mine Health and Safety Amendments Act. The Department of Labor
took over enforcement of mine regulations, and the responsible organization
was renamed the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).116 MSHA
collects accident reports and makes accident statistics publicly available,
helping interested parties determine which safety modifications can address
multiple accidents.117 Safety engineers have used this data to identify the overarching causes of workplace accidents—proximity to dangerous machinery,
for example—and then devised solutions, like proximity sensors that guard
against moments of inattention.118 Experts have also identified different forms
of human error, ranging from violation of a rule to distraction, obstructed
vision, poor technique, or poor communication. By classifying human error
into types, a different solution is found for each one. This “systems-based
approach” no longer assumes that if a worker has a moment of frailty, then
an accident is unavoidable.119
***
Despite the fact that the copper and zinc mines of Grant County and the
potash mines of Carlsbad developed through different processes, southern
New Mexico mine workers—particularly those of Grant County—were
instrumental in raising public awareness on the importance of mine safety.
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Carlsbad potash miners, working in an industry besieged by low profit
margins, had initial success unionizing, but under the pressure of competing unions, unfriendly companies, and red-baiting, they quickly lost the
advantage. Ethnically homogeneous, bound together by the experience of
discrimination, and represented by an effective union, the metal-mining
members of Mine-Mill Local 890, however, were particularly successful.
Using direct action, union safety committees, and lobbying at the federal
level, they exerted pressure on a state inspectorate that was too closely intertwined with the mining companies to effectively identify the party at fault.
The campaign for federal regulation also exerted an effect on the mining
industry, pushing companies to band together to provide safety infrastructure
in order to avoid being federally regulated against their will.
Reynaldo Delgado’s story at the beginning of this piece shows that New
Mexico workers and their families continue to influence the way that workplace accidents are interpreted and addressed. Delgado’s death fell under the
purview of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which was meant to provide an
“exclusive remedy” in the case of injury or death in the workplace. Under
the act, Delgado’s wife Michelle would have been entitled to only two-thirds
of her husband’s weekly wage for eleven years, or a maximum of $200,000.120
Michelle Delgado challenged the traditional belief that her husband’s death
ought to be a predictable cost of mining.
While the district court and the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected
her claim for a civil remedy, the Supreme Court of New Mexico agreed
with Michelle Delgado’s construction of the issue. Workers’ compensation,
the court noted, was supposed to be a compromise: in exchange for certain
compensation, workers and their families gave up their rights to sue for
normal accidents. Until the Delgado case, workers who acted negligently
on the job were prevented from collecting compensation, while employers who knowingly exposed their employees to danger were protected by
workers’ compensation. The Supreme Court noted that “to the extent
that this case reflects an adverse development for employers, we remind
Respondents that workers, whose families may depend for livelihood on
the compensation received under the [Workers’ Compensation] Act, have
consistently been, and will continue to be, deprived compensation under
the same standard we now apply to employers.” All that a company needed
to do to avoid consequences was to take due care, but this decision shifted
that dynamic. “The greater the impact this opinion has on the workers’
compensation system, the greater will have been its need.”121 Little by little,
the idea that workers’ fatalities are an unavoidable part of the toll extracted
continues to erode.
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